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NOTES
SOUTHERN UTE INDIAN TRIBE v. AMOCO
PRODUCTION COMPANY: A CONFLICT OVER
WHAT KILLED THE CANARY
I. INTRODUCTION
A 1913 newspaper report of the Dawson, New Mexico coal mine disaster
details the use of canary birds as gas detectors for rescue crews: "The canary
bird is a sure test for white damp (carbon monoxide) and black damp (carbon
dioxide)."' Both of these gases are produced as by-products of the ignition of
methane, which continuously seeps out of coal and collects in coal mines
[The birds] are taken into the mine [and] watched closely. If they die
suddenly, without a tremor of their little limbs, the presence of the dread-
ed white damp is known and retreat is begun at once unless the rescue
crew is equipped with oxygen helmets. If the bird is seen to go into con-
vulsions before death, black damp and black death is near and advance
must cease. This is a sure test and these little birds are invaluable in test-
ing for the noxious gases.'
Rescuers also carried safety lamps enclosed with a mesh screen in order to
detect black damp and unignited methane.4 Black damp immediately extin-
guishes the safety lamp, whereas methane gas explodes the light within the wire
screen, warning the men of danger while confining the explosion. The canaries
and safety lamps were necessary to detect methane, because "[i]t is a colorless,
1. Canary Birds Die In Mine Gas At.Dawson, That Men May Live, DAWSON NEWS, Oct. 23, 1913,
reprinted in Historical Mining Disasters (Jane DeMarchi ed., 1997).
2. See Eric Margolis, Western Coal Mining as a Way of Life: An Oral History of the Colorado Coal
Miners to 1914, 24 J. OF THE WEST 1, 23 (1985).
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odorless, tasteless gas which is lighter than air." As one memoir reveals, "[a]
wiff of it almost paralyzes a man, and a good breath of it renders him uncon-
scious. Then he falls as if in a sleep and dies unless instantly carried into purer
air.9
7
For decades, miners typically dealt with the accumulations of methane by
forcing fresh air through gassy areas and venting it into the atmosphere.8 When
the methane collected in an area of the mine that was difficult to vent, "fire-
men" were sent in, wrapped in water saturated blankets, to "cause an explosion
by projecting a candle at the end of a long pole into an area.., then fling
themselves on the ground while the flames passed overhead."
As evidenced by these rudimentary techniques for dealing with the gas,
methane was not valued; it was thought to be nothing more than a nuisance to
be controlled by the mining operator."° Although knowledge of methane's
valuable properties was evolving," for the most part, the sentiment that it was
primarily a nuisance persisted until the energy crisis of the early 1970's forced
the search for alternate sources of energy.'
Whenever a substance suddenly comes to have a value which it
hithertofore did not have or when an already valuable substance is found
at a place previously not thought to contain it, there is a likelihood of
conflict between grantors and grantees, lessors and lessees as to whether
earlier, broadly-phrased grants, leases, or reservations had actually includ-
ed the newly desirable substance within their provisions.'3
Although this statement was made in regard to oil shale, it also applies to
coal bed methane ("CBM")."4 The recent case of Southern Ute Indian Tribe v.
Amoco Production Company5 confronted just such a dispute over the owner-
ship of CBM. Plaintiff, Southern Ute Indian Tribe, asserted its right to CBM
based on its ownership of the coal within its reservation borders. 6 Defendant
class representative, Amoco Production Company, claimed its right to produce
CBM from the coal by way of its oil and gas leases. 7 Thus, the central is-
sue 8 as framed by the court was "whether the Tribe, as successor in interest to
6. Margolis, supra note 2, at 23.
7. Id. at 32.
8. See id. at 25.
9. Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 874 F. Supp. 1142, 1155 (D. Colo. 1995).
10. See Ronald K. Olson, Coalbed Methane: Legal Considerations Affecting its Development as an En-
ergy Resource, 13 TULSA L.J. 377, 379, 382 (1978).
11. By 1941, at least one scholar was recognizing the value of CBM. Professor C.C. Williams wrote,
"The abundant presence of gas in various coal strata is a matter of common knowledge, but the intrinsic
worth of these deposits seldom gets attention." C.C. Williams, Jr., On Leasing Gas from Coal Seams, 47 W.
VA. L. Q. 211,212 (1941).
12. See Olson, supra note 10, at 377.
13. Douglas Hale Gross, M.A., J.D., Annotation, Grant, Lease, Exception, or Reservation of Oil And/Or
Gas Rights As Including Oil Shale, 61 A.L.R.3d 1109, 1111 (1975).
14. See Olson, supra note 10, at 378.
15. 119 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 1997).
16. See id. at 819.
17. See id.
18. Collateral issues raised by the defenses of Amoco and the federal defendants were not reached, and
have been remanded. See id. at 836.
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a statutory reservation of coal to the United States made in the coal lands acts
of 1909 and 1910, is also the owner of CBM, a gaseous substance contained in
coal."' 9 The United States Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit, decided the case in
favor of the Southern Ute Tribe based on its interpretation of 1909 and 1910
statutory language which reserved ownership of coal for the United States, the
Tribe's predecessor in interest.'
A basic understanding of the nature of CBM as well as the interests vested
in all concerned parties will be useful prior to discussing the holding in this
case. Therefore, this note begins with an analysis of the properties of CBM and
its production in section II. This is followed by a history of the various owner-
ship interests involved in the case in section III. Section IV contains a statement
of the case and is followed by Section V, which describes the District and the
10th Circuit Court's decisions. In section VI analysis of the decisions is under-
taken.
The analysis section reaches the conclusion that while the court's decision
is correct, it does not go far enough. A determination that the owner of coal
necessarily owns CBM is appropriate in this case, and would be much more
responsive to the growing conflicts over CBM ownership. The court could have
extended the basis for its determination to include the properties of CBM with-
out going beyond the scope of the court's decision making authority.
II. COALBED METHANE: PROPERTIES AND PRODUCTION
"CBM is a by-product of the 'coalification' process."' Coalification is the
biochemical and bacterial transformation of plant life, carbon dioxide and water
which decay to form peat.2 The intermediate product, peat, is converted into
coal, methane, and other gaseous by-products through sedimentary pressure and
the earth's temperature.ra Methane produced in this manner is known as coal
bed methane or CBM.
The average methane gas content of coal is 200 cubic feet per ton, with a
range of 0.1 to 500 cubic feet per ton of coal.24 The volume of methane found
in particular coal strata depends primarily on the characteristics of the coal.'
Geologists rank coal into three major types according to its stage in the
coalification process: lignite, bituminous, and anthracite 6 Methane capacity
19. Id. at 820.
20. See id. at 836.
21. See Jeff L. Lewin, et. al., Unlocking the Fire: A Proposal for Judicial or Legislative Determination
of the Ownership of Coalbed Methane, 94 W. VA. L REV. 563, 572 (1992) [hereinafter Lewin et al., "Un-
locking the Fire"].
22. See id.; see also Olson, supra note 10, at 379.
23. See id.
24. See Olson, supra note 10, at 380; see also Maurice Deul & Ann G. Kim, Coal Beds: A Source of
Natural Gas, 31 (June 16, 1975) OIL AND GAS J. 45, 48 (1975) [hereinafter Deul & Kim, "A Source of Natu-
ral Gas"].
25. See Olson, supra note 10, at 380. Several factors characterize coal, "including the coal rank, the
pressure and temperature, the permeability and porosity of the coal, the degree of fracturing, the distance to
the outcrop, and the permeability of adjacent strata." Lewin et al., Unlocking the Fire, supra note 21, at 573.
26. See Jeffrey R. Levine, Coalification: The Evolution of Coal as Source Rock and Reservoir Rock for
1998]
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tends to increase with rank, with the anthracites in particular having extremely
high methane capacities.' Much of the coal in the Western United States is
located in deeper strata and is thus subjected to greater pressure, which pro-
duces a higher level of CBM in place (less likely to have migrated into frac-
tures).' In the San Juan Basin, the location of the interests at issue, the coal is
primarily bituminous.'
CBM typically consists of between 80 to 99 percent methane, and has a
heating value over approximately 1,000 BTU per cubic foot.' It contains none
of the more hazardous sulphur compounds nor carbon dioxide commonly found
in natural gas, and therefore requires little remediation for use as a fuel.3
Coalbed gas is of pipeline quality, and can be used in almost any application
that normally uses natural gas.32
The amount of CBM in the United States is significant. There may be as
much as 300 trillion cubic feet ("tcf') of recoverable methane in United States
coalbeds.33 In 1992, the San Juan Basin alone produced 446.7 billion cubic
feet ("bef"') which amounted to 80 percent of the total CBM produced in the
United States.3 This amount correlates to energy for 4.9 million homes per
year at an average rate of 250 cubic feet per day.
The technology required to claim CBM is already available.' Methane
production techniques are simple and cost effective.' This is primarily because
methane naturally migrates to boreholes drilled into the coal and rises to the
surface.' Although some production techniques may interfere with subsequent
coal mining operations," this inference is not a significant issue in the Western
United States because much of the coal is non-mineable by known methods due
to its depth.39 Dynamic openhole cavity completion techniques pioneered in
the San Juan Basin have proven quite successful in that deep strata, with one
well experiencing a 30-fold increase in rate of gas production over the vertical
cased hole method which had been utilized.'
Oil and Gas, in AAFG STUDIES IN GEOLOGY #38: HYDROCARBONS FROM COAL 39, 43-47 (B.E. Law and
D.D. Rice eds., 1993).
27. See id. at 47.
28. See Lewin et al., Unlocking the Fire, supra note 21, 575-576.
29. See R. Choate, et al., Upper Cretaceous Geology, Coal, and the Potential for Methane Recovery
from Coalbeds in San Juan Basin-Colorado and New Mexico, AAPG STUDIES IN GEOLOGY SERIES #17:
CXALBED METHANE RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES 185, 192 (Craig T. Rightmire, et al. eds., 1984).
30. See A.G. Kim and M. Deul, Conservation of Methane Drained From Coal, METHANE CONTROL RE-
SEARCH: SUMMARY OF RESULTS, 1964-80, 150 (Maurice Deul and Ann G. Kim, eds., Bureau of Mines Bulle-
tin/1988) [hereinafter Kim & Deul,"Conservation"].
31. See id.
32. See id. at 150-51.
33. See Deul & Kim, Coal Beds: A Source of Natural Gas, supra note 24, at 47.
34. See D. Keith Murray, Coalbed methane in the USA: analogues for worldwide development,
COALBED METHANE AND COAL GEOLOGY 1, 4 (R. Gayer & I. Harris eds., 1996).
35. See Deul & Kim, Coal Beds: A Source of Natural Gas, supra note 24, at 48.
36. See Olson, supra note 10, at 381.
37. See id. The natural migration of methane is explained by the fact that the methane pressure within
coal usually exceeds atmospheric pressure. See Lewin et al., Unlocking the Fire, supra note 21, at 572.
38. See id. at 578.
39. See id. at 575-576.
40. See Murray, supra note 34, at 45.
[Vol. 33:909
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Interest in CBM's value and capture techniques are of fairly recent vin-
tage." Although CBM's hazardous nature has been studied by the Bureau of
Mines since its inception in 1910,' the beneficial aspects of the gas were rele-
gated to a secondary position, while studies focused on controlling the gas.4
This focus makes sense, in that ignition of accumulated CBM is the greatest
cause of deadly mine explosions." At least until 1969, legislation regarding
CBM was also more concerned with its hazardous nature than with its value as
an energy source.'
CBM's value in the United States has only been sought on a significant
scale since the energy crisis of the 1970's.4 Since that time, CBM production
has undergone dramatic growth. From 1987 to 1991, CBM gas production in
the United States underwent more than a thirteen-fold increase from 26 bcf to
348 bcfl In 1992, the San Juan basin alone provided over 80 percent of total
production from only 38 percent of all CBM wells.'
The foregoing establishes that CBM is a readily producible gas that comes
from coal. As such, it has been considered both an element of coal and a gas.
This distinction is not important when dealing with a complete fee simple abso-
lute, because the interest holder controls the entire estate.49 Even if mineral
interests have been severed as a bundle from the surface estate, ownership of
CBM is not in doubt; the holder of mineral interest controls.0 A problem aris-
es where mineral interests have been further dispersed. Specifically, if the coal
interest has been severed from other mineral interests, there exists an under-
standable tension between the oil and gas interest holder and the coal interest
holder." They each claim that CBM is their rightful province. 2 The oil and
gas interest holder can point to CBM's gaseous properties and similarities to
natural gas. The coal interest holder can argue that coal is the origin of CBM,
and thus CBM is a coal derivative. These very arguments are the basis of
Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Production Company, and will be exam-
ined more fully in sections IV through VI.
41. See Donald F. Santa, Jr. & Patricia J. Beneke, Federal Natural Gas Policy and the Energy Policy
Act of 1992, 14 ENERGY L.J. 1, 44-45 (1993).
42. See Olson, supra note 10, at 380.
43. See Kim & Deul, Conservation, supra note 30, at 150.
44. See Olson, supra note 10, at 380.
45. The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 regulates acceptable concentrations of meth-
ane and provides penalties for mines operating above the proscribed levels. See generally 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-
960 (1976).
46. See Lewin et al., Unlocking the Fire, supra note 21, at 567.
47. See Santa, supra note 41, at 44-45.
48. See Murray, supra note 34, at 4.
49. See Jeff L. Lewin, Coalbed Methane: Recent Court Decisions Leave Ownership "Up In The Air,"
But New Federal And State Legislation Should Facilitate Production, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 631, 636 (1994)
[hereinafter Lewin, "Coalbed Methane"].
50. See id. Case law also holds that both coal and gas are included in a mineral estate. See, e.g., Scott v.
Laws, 215 S.W. 81, 82 (Ky. 1919); Kentucky West Virginia Gas v. Preece, 86 S.W.2d 163, 165 (Ky. 1935);
Hurley v. West Kentucky Coal, 171 S.W.2d 15, 17 (Ky. 1943); Berry v. Hiawatha, 198 S.W.2d 497, 498 (Ky.
1946).
51. See Lewin, Coalbed Methane, supra note 49, at 636.
52. See id. at 637.
1998]
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III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Southern Ute Property Interests
The Southern Ute's occupation and ownership of property, both surface
and subsurface, in the Southwestern United States has undergone significant
changes since the mid-1800's due to Federal government actions. These chang-
es play a consequential role in understanding the issue of current CBM owner-
ship.
In the 1800's the Ute Indians53 occupied a region spanning Western Colo-
rado, Northern New Mexico, and Utah.5" However, by the Treaty of 1868, the
Ute Indian Bands collectively traded their aboriginal lands to the United States
for a 15.7 million acre reservation located exclusively in Southwest Colora-
do.55 Less than ten years later, the discovery of valuable minerals on reserva-
tion lands prompted the government to convince the Utes to approve the Brunot
Cession in 187 4 .56 This agreement ceded an additional 3.7 million acres of the
east central portion of the reservation, isolating the Southern Utes in the south-
ernmost part of the reservation on a strip of land 15 miles wide and 110 miles
long.57
This isolation may have helped the Southern Utes to remain on their land
after an uprising, in 1879, termed The Meeker Massacre.8 Public outcry over
the massacre led to the Act of 1880'9 which terminated tribal ownership of
reservation lands, and limited individual Indian ownership to lands allotted for
the purpose of settlement. 0 The settlement areas for the three current Bands
were circumscribed and led to the departure from Colorado of the White River
Utes and the Uncompahgre Utes." The Southern Utes remained on the land
they had occupied since the Brunot Cession in 1874.62 Allotments to individual
53. Original Ute tribes included the Tabequache, Moache, Capote, Weeminuche, Yampa, Grand River
and Uintah Bands of Utes. By the late 1860's, the Moache, Capote and Weeminuche Bands were known
collectively as the Southern Utes, while the Tabequaches were called the Uncompahgre Utes, and the Yampa,
Grand River and Uintah were known as the White River Utes. All the bands were informally organized and
referred to as the Confederated Band of Utes. See United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians,
423 F.2d 346, 348 (Ct. CI. 1970).
54. See id.
55. See id. (citation omitted).
56. See id. (citation omitted).
57. See United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. 159, 162 (1971). A combina-
tion of band migration and the Brunot Cession were contributing factors. See id.
.58. See Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 874 F. Supp. 1142, 1148 (D. Colo. 1995).
Twelve non-Indians, including Indian Agent Meeker, were killed. See id.
59. See id. The Act provided that by agreement, the Confederated Bands would "cede to the United
States all the territory of the present Ute Reservation in Colorado, except as hereinafter provided for their
settlement." Act of June 15, 1880, ch. 223, 21 Stat. 200.
60. See Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 402 U.S. at 163. The purposes of the Act of 1880 were
to break up tribal structure and to convert the Indians from nomadic to agrarian people. See 10 CONO. REC.
2056, 2059 (1880).
61. See Act of June 15, 1880, ch. 223, 21 Stat. 200. The settlement required the White River Utes leave
Colorado and settle agricultural lands on the Uintah Reservation in Utah; the Uncompahgre Utes agreed to
settle on agricultural lands on the Grand River, near the mouth of the Gunnison River in Colorado. The
Southern Utes were to settle near the La Plata River in Colorado. See id.
62. See United States v. Southern Ute Tribe or Band of Indians, 423 F.2d 346, 348 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 33 [1997], Iss. 3, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol33/iss3/6
SOUTHERN UTE INDIAN TRIBE v. AMOCO
Southern Ute Indians were not made until 1895.63
B. Governmental Management and Sale of Non-Allotted Lands
The most important feature of the Act of 1880, as it relates to the Southern
Ute's case against Amoco, is the United States ownership of non-allotted
land. ' The United States was empowered to sell the non-allotted lands to
which they held title, with proceeds to be distributed to the Confederated Bands
by share, 6 after certain Government reimbursements.6
Throughout several decades from the late-1800's through the early-1900's,
the United States government made the non-allotted lands available for public
entry and settlement under various public land laws.' Under the Homestead
Act of 1862, fee simple absolute title to 160 acres could be acquired at no
cost.6 The Coal Lands Act of 1873 provided that fee simple absolute title to
160 acres would cost between $10 and $20 depending on the proximity of the
land to a railroad.69 Oil and gas explorers were able to purchase land for $5
per acre.'
Due to the passive nature of classifying lands7 as primarily valuable for
agriculture, coal, or other minerals, patents issued for millions of acres of valu-
able western coal lands were erroneously reported to be valuable primarily for
non-coal mining use. 2 By the turn of the century the increasing dependence
on coal as the country's primary energy source, coupled with the awareness of
widespread fraud,73 spawned a movement to replace the troubled land classifi-
George W. Manypenny, chairman of the Ute Commission founded to aid in the implementation of the Act of
1880, recommended that due to the difficulty envisioned in relocating the Band, the strip of land that the
Southern Utes were occupying be maintained as an Indian reservation indefinitely. See id. at 350-51 (citing
H.R. Doc. No. 10-2018, at 383 (1882)).
63. See Act of Feb. 20, 1895, ch. 113, 28 Stat. 677-78. By the Act of 1895, allotments were made to
individual Indians, and a portion was set aside for those Southern Utes who wanted their own reservation
rather than allotments. See id.
64. See Act of June 15, 1880, ch. 223, 21 Stat. 203. "[All the lands not so allotted, the title to which
is... released and conveyed to the United States, shall be held and deemed to be public lands of the United
States." Id.
65. The apportionment was to be one-third to the Southern Utes: one-half to the Uncompahgre Utes and
one-sixth to the White River Utes. See Act of June 15, 1880, ch. 223, 21 Stat. 201.
66. See Act of June 15, 1880, ch. 223, 21 Stat. 203.
67. See Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 874 F. Supp. 1142, 1148 (D. Colo. 1995). Three
of the public land laws that allowed entry include the Homestead Act of 1862, the Coal Lands Act of 1873,
and the Mining Law of 1872. See id.
68. 43 U.S.C. §161 et seq. (1891)(repealed 1976).
69. See Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 279, 17 Stat. 607.
70. See 42 Stat. 1144, 1145 (1925) (codified at 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 29, 30,37 (1988)).
71. See Watt v. Western Nuclear, 462 U.S. 36, 49 n.9 (1983). Classification was based primarily on the
affidavits of entrymen, which were brought into question only by surveyor reports or other contradictory
information. See id.
72. See id. Lands conveyed under a land-grant statute gave the patentee title to the entire land, including
any subsequently discovered minerals. The Government had no recourse once title passed, even where the
lands were misclassified. See id.
73. See Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 874 F. Supp. 1142, 1149 (D. Colo. 1995). Price
differentials and allowed usage of agricultural land versus mineral land served as incentives for entrymen to
misclassify lands. Of the more than 6 million acres of coal lands entered between 1873 and 1906, only about
400,000 were purchased under the Coal Lands Act of 1873. Railroad monopolies were implicated in fraudu-
lently acquiring much of the coal land. See id.
1998]
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cation system with a system of mineral reservations.74 In 1907, citing the need
to manage coal in a manner that would benefit the public as a whole, President
Theodore Roosevelt withdrew approximately 65 million acres of land in the
western states, thought to contain coal, from public entry programs. 5 Included
in the withdrawal was the acreage ceded to the United States by the Southern
Utes.76
In addition to the withdrawal, issuance of patents to those already on the
lands were suspended.' The suspension alarmed homesteaders who had made
improvements to the land they occupied and to which they intended to obtain
title.78 In response, President Roosevelt urged Congress to enact legislation
separating rights to the surface of public land from rights to the "forests upon it
and to minerals beneath it," making them subject to separate disposal. 9 Con-
gress responded with enaction of the Coal Lands Act of 1909:
Any person who has in good faith located, selected, or entered under the
nonmineral land laws of the United States any lands which subsequently
are classified, claimed, or reported as being valuable for coal, may, if he
shall so elect, and upon making satisfactory proof of compliance with the
laws under which such lands are claimed, receive a patent therefor, which
shall contain a reservation to the United States of all coal in said lands,
and the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same. The coal depos-
its in such lands shall be subject to disposal by the United States in accor-
dance with the provisions of the coal-land laws in force at the time of
such disposal, but no person shall enter upon said lands to prospect for, or
mine and remove coal therefrom without previous consent of the owner
under such patent, except upon such conditions as to security for and
payment of all damages to such owner caused thereby as may be deter-
mined by a court of competent jurisdiction. The owner under such patent
shall have the right to mine coal for use on the land for domestic purpos-
es prior to the disposal by the United States of the coal deposit. Nothing
herein contained shall be held to affect or abridge the right of any locator,
selector, or land located, selected, or entered by him. Such locator, selec-
tor, or entryman who has made or shall make final proof showing good
faith and satisfactory compliance with the law under which his land is
claimed shall be entitled to a patent without reservation unless at the time
of such final proof and entry it shall be shown that the land is chiefly
valuable for coal.8
The scope of the 1909 Act was limited to lands already settled."' Thus,
the potential remained that vast tracts of withdrawn land would remain unset-
fled. Although substantially similar to the 1909 Act, the 1910 Act was pro-






79. See Watt v. Western Nuclear, 462 U.S. 36, 39 (1983).
80. Act of March 3, 1909, ch. 270, 35 Stat. 844 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 81).
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. The 1910 Act reads:
[Vol. 33:909
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During the first three decades of the 20th century, the United States patent-
ed more than 16 million acres in the west under the 1909 and 1910 Acts.8 4 Of
that number, 1.35 million acres were located in Colorado, including the surplus
lands on the Southern Ute Reservation which had been opened to non-Indian
homestead entry.s The patents issued to homesteaders between 1909 and the
early 1930's reserved the coal to the United States.' The gas interest holders
that made up "[t]he non-federal defendant class in (Southern Ute Indian Tribe
v. Amoco Production Company]... claim their respective rights, titles, and
interests as successors in interest to these patentees."
' p
C. A New Era for Native American Diplomacy
Acknowledging its failure to adequately deal with Indian Tribes throughout
the country, including the situation in Ute territory, the United States changed
its policy of tribal minimization through individual allotment and assimilation in
the early to mid-1930's.' This return to a tribal system was codified as the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA). 9 The IRA empowered the Secretary
of the Interior, acting in the public interest, to restore remaining surplus lands
of reservations, to tribal ownership.
In 1938, under the authority of the IRA, the Department of the Interior
conveyed to the Southern Ute Tribe equitable title in approximately
200,000 acres of coal which had previously been reserved to the United
States in patents issued over the years to non-Indian entrymen under the
1909 and 1910 Acts.91
Upon satisfactory proof of full compliance with the provisions of the laws under which entry is
made. .. the entryman shall be entitled to a patent to the land entered by him, which patent shall
contain a reservation to the United States of all the coal in the lands so patented, together with the
right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same. The coal deposits in such lands shall be subject to
disposal by the United States in accordance with the provisions of the coal-land laws in force at the
time of such disposal. Any person qualified to acquire coal deposits or the right to mine and remove
the coal under the laws of the United States shall have the right, at all times, to enter upon the lands
selected, entered, or patented ... for the purpose of prospecting for coal thereon upon the approval
by the Secretary of the Interior of a bond or undertaking to be filed with him as security for the
payment of all damages to the crops and improvements on such lands by reason of such prospecting.
Any person who has acquired from the United States the coal deposits in any such land, or the right
to mine or remove the same, may reenter and occupy so much of the surface mining and removal of
the coal therefrom, and mine and remove the coal, upon payment of the damages caused thereby to
the owner thereof, or upon giving a good and sufficient bond or undertaking in an action instituted in
any competent court to ascertain and fix said damages. The owner under such limited patent shall
have the right to mine coal for use upon the land for domestic purposes at any time prior to the dis-
posal by the United States of the coal deposits. Nothing herein contained shall be held to deny or
abridge the right to present and have prompt consideration of applications to locate, enter, or select,
under the land laws of the United States, lands which have been classified as coal lands with a view
of disproving such classification and securing a patent without reservation.
Act of June 22, 1910, ch. 318, §36 Stat. 584 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §85).





89. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 461-479 (1988).
90. See id.
91. Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 874 F. Supp. 1142, 1151 (D. Colo. 1995).
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Acts of 1909 and 1910, in conjunction with the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934, placed ownership of "coal" located within the boundaries of the
Southern Ute reservation in the hands of the Southern Ute Indian Tribe.93
Successors in interest to patents issued by the government under the 1909 and
1910 Acts own all other property interests, including oil and gas. 4 The Tribe's
claim to the CBM is based on their ownership of the source of CBM, coalY5
The successors in interest's claim to the CBM is based on their ownership of
gas.
9 6
The Tribe brought suit against Amoco and others' claiming that by ex-
ploring for and extracting CBM under oil and gas leases, the Amoco defendants
had: "1) trespassed on Tribal lands; 2) trespassed on Tribal coal; 3) converted
Tribal coal; 4) failed to pay severance tax to the Tribe; and 5) in collusion with
State of Colorado officials, deprived the Tribe of federally guaranteed rights in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. '
The Tribe sought a variety of remedies including:
1) a declaratory judgment vesting in the Tribe ownership of CBM and
other substances contained in Tribal coal; 2) a declaratory judgment that
Tribal consent is required for CBM extraction; 3) an order quieting title to
CBM in the Tribe; 4) injunctive relief to prevent continued exploration
and production of CBM without Tribal consent; 5) damages for present
and future injuries to coal, for extraction of CBM, for conversion of coal,
for civil rights violations, and for failure to pay severance taxes; 6) title to
all exploration and production facilities on Tribal lands which, if removed,
would interrupt production of CBM; and 7) costs and attorney's fees."
92. The reservation is an amalgamation of varied ownership interests, including:
tribal lands held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the Tribe, lands held by the Tribe in
its own name, individual Indian land allotments subject to federal trust restrictions, land owned in fee
simple by individual Indians, and lands held in fee simple by non-Indian third parties.
Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Board of County Comm'rs, 855 F. Supp. 1194, 1196 (D. Colo. 1994).
93. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 81, 85 (reserving the coal interest).
94. See id.
95. See Southern Ute 1, 874 F. Supp. at 1147.
96. See id. at 1146.
97. The District Court certified a defendant class comprised of other oil companies and individuals who
claim ownership interests in the CBM. See id. "An estimated 20,000 individuals hold interests in the oil and
gas estates underlying approximately 200,000 acres of land in which the Tribe owns the coal interests."
Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Production Company, 2 F.3d 1023, 1025 (10th Cir. 1993). Amoco, own-
er of approximately 150,000 acres of oil and gas leasehold interests, and operator of approximately 160 of the
350 coalbed methane wells, see id., was named as the defendant class representative. See Southern Ute Indian
Tribe, 874 F. Supp. at 1146. "The Tribe also sued various federal governmental entities (federal defendants)
claiming breach of fiduciary duty to manage the Tribe's trust resources." Id. The claims against the federal
defendants are not resolved in the underlying case, and are beyond the scope of this note.
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V. DECISIONS BY THE COURTS
A. Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Production Companyre ("Southern
Ute I")
The issue of CBM ownership under the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910
was one of first impression at the district court level.' 1 District Judge Bab-
cock held as a matter of law that the United States Reservation of "coal" did
not include a reservation of coal bed methane gas."ra His theory was that if
the CBM was not reserved to the United States, it passed under the patents
issued to entrymen under the 1909 and 1910 Acts.' Therefore, when the Sec-
retary of the Interior returned interests it had been holding for the benefit of the
Indians, the title to the CBM had already been transferred, and all that remained
was the coal rock."°
In light of this holding, and upon cross-motions for summary judgment,
the district court awarded judgment in favor of the defendant class on the issue
of ownership of CBM. °' This judgment made moot the claimed breach of fi-
duciary duty in the management of CBM as a tribal resource."re Thus, summa-
ry judgment was also entered in favor of the federal defendants. 7
B. Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Production Company"8 ("Southern
Ute 11")
On appeal, the 10th Circuit reversed the district court, holding "that the
Southern Ute Indian Tribe, as successor in interest to coal reserved to the Unit-
ed States by the Acts of 1909 and 1910, is the owner of coal bed methane
contained in that coal."'" This holding required the court to remand the case
because the district court did not reach the Southern Ute Tribe's actual claims
against any of the defendants or weigh any defenses offered." '
C. Statutory Interpretation and Construction
As Southern Ute I and II make clear, the nature of CBM complicates statu-
tory construction and ownership determinations. Both cases were primarily
100. 874 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Colo. 1995) [hereinafter "Southern Ute 1"].
101. See Southern Ute I, 874 F. Supp. at 1151. Although the question of CBM ownership is not a new
one, this is the first federal case that set about determining whether Congress included CBM gas in its reser-
vation to the United States of "coal" under the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910. See id.
102. See id. at 1151-52.
103. See id. at 1152.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 1146.
106. It follows logically that if the Southern Ute Indian Tribe did not own the CBM, the federal defen-
dants were under no duty to manage it for them.
107. See Southern Ute 1, 874 F. Supp. at 1146.
108. 119 F.3d 1023 (10th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter "Southern Ute I"].
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concerned with only one issue, ownership of CBM.'" Both courts sought the
answer to the central question in the same place, the statute that severed the
interests." 2 And, both cases applied the same basic rules of statutory con-
struction." 3 Yet the resolution of CBM ownership in the cases are diametrical-
ly opposed." 4 Therefore, the following discussion juxtaposes the two cases
and highlights the areas where Southern Ute I and II diverge.
As noted above, the district court and the 10th Circuit Court reached their
holdings in Southern Ute I and II by analyzing the language of the 1909 and
1910 Coal Land Acts. The courts engaged in both statutory interpretation and
construction. First, an attempt was made to ascertain the Acts' plain meaning,
looking primarily at the specific language in question and then to the 1909 and
1910 Acts in toto."5 Second, a determination of Congressional intent at the
time of the Acts' passage was sought by application of various rules of con-
struction."6
1. Plain Meaning of the Statutes
Both the district court and the 10th Circuit began with an examination of
the relevant statutory language because when construing a statute, the will of
Congress is primary, "and where its will has been expressed in reasonably plain
terms, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.""' 7 The rele-
vant language in the 1909 and 1910 Acts are virtually identical. The 1909 Act
states, "[a]ny person... shall... upon making satisfactory proof of compli-
ance with the laws under which such lands are claimed, receive a patent there-
for, which shall contain a reservation to the United States of all coal in said
lands, and the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same."'"8 The 1910
Act states that the "patent shall contain a reservation to the United States of all
the coal in the lands so patented, together with the right to prospect for, mine,
and remove the same."'" 9
As emphasized, the key word is "coal." However, as both courts note, the
word is not defined in either the 1909 or 1910 Act."2° There is no mention of
the constituents of coal or its by-product, methane.' The 10th Circuit, in
111. Compare Southern Ute1, 874 F. Supp. at 1146 with Southern Utell, 119 F.3d at 820.
112. Compare Southern Ute 1, 874 F. Supp. at 1152 with Southern Ute 11, 119 F.3d at 820-21.
113. Compare generally Southern Ute 1, 874 F. Supp. 1142 with Southern Ute 11, 119 F.3d 816 (Both
opinions apply the plain meaning test, and a variety of rules including resort to legislative history to deter-
mine specific and general congressional intent.).
114. Compare Southern Ute 1, 874 F. Supp. at 1161 with Southern Ute 11, 119 F.3d at 836.
115. See Southern Ute I, 874 F. Supp. at 1152; Southern Ute 11, 119 F.3d at 821.
116. See Southern Ute 1, 874 F. Supp. at 1154; Southern Ute 11, 119 F.3d at 821 (a discussion of the rules
of construction applied by both courts follows, in the text).
117. Southern Ute 1, 874 F. Supp. at 1152 (quoting Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993)).
Southern Ute II agrees, using virtually identical language. See Southern Ute 11, 119 F.3d 821 (quoting Griffin
v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982)).
118. 30 U.S.C. §81 (1909) (emphasis added).
119. 30 U.S.C. § 85 (1910) (emphasis added).
120. See Southern Ute 1, 874 F. Supp. at 1153; Southern Ute 11, 119 F.3d at 821.
121. See Southern Ute 1, 874 F. Supp. at 1154; Southern Ute 11, 119 F.3d at 821.
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Southern Ute II, felt that this lack of specificity alone was enough to render the
reservation ambiguous.'22 Therefore, it immediately looked to other means to
determine congressional intent.123 It is on this threshold analysis of plain
meaning and ambiguity that Southern Ute I and II first diverge.
The Southern Ute I decision is premised on the finding that use of the
word "coal" in the 1909 and 1910 Acts is not ambiguous.'24 The theory is that
Congress, by not broadly defining "coal," intended to accord the word its ordi-
nary and common meaning at the time of enactment, a solid rock fuel.' 2
Therefore, there was no need to search for additional Congressional intent.
126
District Judge Babcock's decision is based primarily on the rule of construction
that "[tihe apparent natural meaning of a statute will be preferred to any hidden,
curious 'signification."" '  And, that "if words of common use [are contained
in a statute, they] are to be construed in their natural, plain and ordinary signifi-
cance.
,, 28
District Judge Babcock offers several dictionary definitions of coal and gas
from the time that the Acts were promulgated until now, noting that the defimi-
tions remained consistent from 1889 until 1986.29 At the time of enaction,
coal was defined as, "a black, or brownish black, solid, combustible substance
consisting... mainly of carbon."'" Gas was defined as "an aeriform fluid
supposed to be permanently elastic. .. now applied to any substance when in
the elastic or aeriform state.... The judge points out that over time coal has
been defined narrowly whereas gas has been defined broadly, reaching the
conclusion that CBM has never, and still does not, fit into the narrow definition
of coal, but is consistent with the definition of gas."
The 10th Circuit disagreed with the district court in its evaluation of dic-
tionary definitions. Specifically, the 10th Circuit found that CBM does not fit
the typical definition of gas. 33 In reaching this conclusion, the 10th Circuit
discussed the physical properties of coal and the fact that through adsorption,
the CBM does not, for the most part, migrate away from its source rock as
other natural gases do, but is trapped within its source, coal. 34 Thus, in situ,
CBM is not a fluid substance with the ability to expand indefinitely without
122. See Southern Ute 11, 119 F.3d at 821.
123. See id.
124. See Southern Ute I, 874 F. Supp. at 1152.
125. See id. at 1153-54.
126. See id. at 1154.
127. Id. at 1152 (citing United States v. Colorado & N.W.R. Co., 157 F. 321, 322 (8th Cir. 1907)).
128. Southern Ute 1, 874 F. Supp. at 1152 (quoting Balanced Rock Scenic Attractions v. Town of Mani-
tou, 38 F.2d 28, 30 (10th Cir. 1930)).
129. See Southern Ute I, 874 F. Supp. at 1153. The dictionary definitions of coal and gas come from the
American Dictionary of the English Language 244, 560 (1889), The Webster's New International Dictionary
of the English Language 424, 892 (1920) and Webster's Third New International Dictionary 432, 937 (1986)
(all in respective order). See id.
130. Id. (citation omitted).
131. Id. (citation omitted).
132. Id.
133. See Southern Ute 11, 119 F.3d 822 & n.9.
134. See id. at 822.
1998]
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inducing a physical change in its reservoir."
Under the preliminadry analysis of plain meaning, the district court deter-
mined that Congressional intent was clear, to reserve only the solid rock coal to
the United States by the Coal Land Acts of 1909 and 1910. The 10th Circuit
Court of Appeals found that the lack of specificity of the Acts, in regard to the
meaning of coal, rendered them ambiguous.
2. Specific Congressional Intent
Even though the Southern Ute I holding is based on the district court's
understanding of the plain meaning of the 1909 and 1910 Acts, the court went
on to apply alternate rules of construction and to discuss congressional intent as
a means of supporting that holding. In Southern Ute 11, the 10th Circuit ap-
plied alternate rules of construction in order to determine Congressional intent
where it perceived ambiguity.' 37 As discussed in relation to the plain meaning
of "coal," congressional intent is determined at the time the Acts were promul-
gated, in 1909 and 1910."5
Southern Ute I begins the analysis of intent with a listing of rules to sup-
port its position that both the legislative history and the construction placed on
the statute by the agency which administers it can be used to determine Con-
gressional intent."3 While case law supports Souther Ute I's propositions: that
clear evidence of legislative intent trumps construction, that it is appropriate to
look to the object and policy of a statute as well as the context of its enaction,
and that intentional silence is probative of intent,"4 Southern Ute 17 found that
the district court's reliance on the administrative agency's construction of the
Acts was misplaced in this case.'' The portion of both opinions dealing with
the Solicitor to the Secretary of the Interior's opinion are not integral to the
determinations made in either case, and therefore will not be discussed here.42
Southern Ute I stresses that legislators in 1909 were informed on the topic
of coal, and knew of the hazardous nature of CBM. 43 The committee respon-
sible for authoring the bills that were passed as the 1909 and 1910 Acts had
access to many reports addressing various aspects of coal.'" The court ac-
135. See hi. at 822 & n.8.
136. See Southern Ute 1, 874 F. Supp. 1154.
137. See Southern Ute 11, 119 F.3d at 821.
138. See id. at 822; Southern Ute 1, 874 F. Supp. at 1155.
139. See Southern Ute I, 874 F. Supp. at 1154 (citing Amgen Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 902 F.2d
1532, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
140. See Southern Ute I, 874 F. Supp. at 1154-55 (citing Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 855 F.2d
1556, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Aulston v. United States, 915 F.2d 584, 589 (10th Cir. 1990); North Haven Bd.
of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982); Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n v. Federal Labor Relations Au-
thor., 879 F.2d 1225, 1230 (4th Cir. 1989); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 217
(1984); FDIC v. Isham, 777 F. Supp. 828, 831 (D. Colo. 1991); In re Providence Television Ltd. Partnership,
75 B.R. 139, 140 (N.D. Il. 1987)).
141. See Southern Ute 11, 119 F.3d at 835-36 mThe Solicitor to the Secretary of the Interior opinion con-
tains factual limitations that militate against its application here.).
142. See Southern Ute I, 874 F. Supp. at 1160; Southern Ute 1, 119 F.3d at 836 & n.26.
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knowledges that "[a] pervasive theme in these reports is the focus on coal as
the primary energy resource for the United States. '1 5 Committee hearings
transcripts indicate congressional awareness of the relationship of CBM to coal
and the possibility that CBM would have value in the future."* Critical to the
decision in Southern Ute I was that no where in the written reports or congres-
sional testimony, was it specified that CBM ought to be reserved in the United
States by the Acts. 47
The breadth of the Acts was discussed on the House floor, where the ques-
tion was raised whether a reservation of all minerals would be preferable to
reserving only coal under the 1909 Act.'4 The answer was no, because it was
believed that a reservation of coal was as significant a departure from past
practice as was necessary to protect governments interests.' 49 In 1910, when
the more specific question was raised as to why other fuels such as gas and oil
were not included, the response was that "[o]il and gas present much greater
difficulties, when we propose to separate the surface from the mineral.' 50
Southern Ute I emphasizes these portions of legislative history to indicate that
Congress intended a narrow departure from the practice of granting fee simple
absolute title to homesteaders.' Southern Ute I also points to the progressive
broadening of United States Government reservations of valuable interests.'52
As the 1909 and 1910 Acts came early in the evolution of public land acts, the
district court determined that Congress intended a narrow reservation, which did
not include CBM although that intent is not specified.'
The district court's rationale accords with Amoco's argument in Southern
Ute I. Amoco asserts that because Congress was aware of methane in 1909, it
had the opportunity to broaden the definition of coal to retain more than the
solid rock coal if it so desired, but it did not. Thus, its silence is probative of an
intent not to include CBM.154 In response, the 10th Circuit points out that
Congress' silence could be attributable to other factors. Specifically, "Congress
may have considered CBM to be a part of that solid coal.' 55 Southern Ute 11
acknowledges that "Congress almost certainly knew in 1909 that gas could be
extracted from coal."'- However, the 10th Circuit highlights fundamental dif-
ferences in extraction methods between the early 1900's and current times:57
"[c]oal degasification required mining and extraction of coal, then releasing the
145. Id. at 1156.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See 45 CONG. REC. 2504 (1909).
149. See id.
150. 45 CONG. REC. 6044 (1910).
151. See Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 874 F. Supp. 1142, 1157 (D. Colo. 1995).
152. See id. at 1158.
153. See id. at 1159.
154. See Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 119 F.3d 816, 822 (10th Cir. 1997).
155. Id. at 822. "Indeed, it seems to us quite unlikely that Congress, if it had considered the matter,
would have reasoned, 'We want the Government to hold on to the solid bituminous core of these coal depos-
its, but we make no claim to the thin layer of molecules of CBM which coats the surfaces.'" Id. at 823.
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gas by mechanically crushing the coal... or heating it."' In 1909, the tech-
nology did not exist to remove CBM from coal leaving the solid rock behind,
thus CBM was necessarily a part of the coal. 5 9
The 10th Circuit declined to infer from Congress' silence or use of the
word "coal" a specific intent towards CBM, knowing there were no means for
commercial production."6 The gist of the 10th Circuit's determination was
that CBM's value was unappreciated in 1909 and 1910, therefore the Acts did
not reveal Congress' specific intent.' This view accords with other cases
concerning reservations where the grantor either did not know of the existence
of an element, or did not appreciate its value.62 Under such circumstances,
the court would have to assume that Congress "viewed CBM as a component
distinct from solid rock coal, knew CBM was severable, knew that it had a
value, and purposefully chose to reject that value" in order to hold that Con-
gress had a specific intent not to reserve CBM.'63
3. General Congressional Intent
Since the 10th Circuit Court determined that evidence of specific congres-
sional intent was lacking, it looked to the purposes of the grant in terms of
enjoyment of the rights created in order to determine general congressional
intent.' The court relied on the concept that general intent can be more accu-
rate than specific intent when a component previously regarded as a nuisance
becomes valuable." The court found a broad general congressional intent to
retain coal, even that coal which was not currently valuable commercially, for
the benefit of the United States."c
While the 10th Circuit agreed with the district court that Congress consid-
ered and rejected a reservation of all minerals, it disagreed that the decision was
telling of Congress' intent towards CBM 67 It determined that a rejection of
all minerals did not compel a construction as narrow as the district court
urged. 68 The 10th Circuit pointed to the fact that Congress considered and
rejected other alternatives, including a reservation of only coal which was mar-
ketable in 1907 in favor of reserving all coal." "[T]he legislative history sug-
gests that Congress adopted an interpretation of coal which encompassed both
the present and future economic value of coal, including value that could only
158. Id.
159. See id. at 823.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id. (citing United States v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 549 F.2d 1271, 1273 (9th Cir. 1977); Northern
Natural Gas Co., 441 F.2d 704, 714-15 (10th Cir. 1971); Aulston v. United States, 915 F.2d 584, 594 (10th
Cir. 1990)).
163. See Southern Ute II, 119 F.3d at 824.
164. See id.
165. See Northern Natural Gas, 441 F.2d at 714-15.
166. See Southern Ute 11, 119 F.3d at 826.
167. See id. at 825-826.
168. See id. at 825.
169. See id. at 826.
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be realized through advances in technology such as those which drive the pres-
ent day exploration for CBM.' 170  A broad interpretation finds support in
other decisions concerning United States land grants. 171 In Walt v. Western
Nuclear," the United States Supreme Court determined that gravel was in-
cluded in a coal and mineral reservation under the Stock-Raising Homestead
Act of 1916273 Interpreting the same Act, the 9th Circuit held that geothermal
energy was also reserved." The 1914 Agricultural Entry Act,'75 which re-
served "'phosphate, nitrate, potash, oil, gas, or asphaltic minerals"' was at issue
in Aulston v. United States, where the 10th Circuit determined that the reserva-
tion included carbon dioxide. 76 That court also held in Brennan v. Udall that
"oil" in the 1914 Act included oil shale." The 10th Circuit in Southern Ute H
noted, "we have found no occasion in which a reservation of a mineral asset to
the United States has been treated narrowly to exclude a newly appreciated
value associated with that mineral. '7
As additional support for its determination, the 10th Circuit pointed out
that Congress itself has considered the breadth of the 1909 and 1910 Coal
Lands Acts, and indicated that "coal" should be interpreted broadly."7 In
1955, Congress passed an Act entitled "Entry and Location on Coal Lands on
Discovery of Source Material," in which it granted to surface patentees the right
to mine for coal containing uranium where the United States held the coal
rights.8 The court accepted that a House of Representatives Report articulates
the presumption that entrymen possessed fee simple title to all other minerals in
the land, including valuable source minerals, regardless of the host material or
the mode of occurrence.' However, it concluded that "[tihe fact that Con-
gress ultimately decided it must pass a statute to grant the surface patentees
rights to uranium suggests that Congress did not believe the presumption ex-
tended to source minerals contained in federally owned coal."'8 The court's
understanding of the congressional rationale that an imbedded mineral like
uranium was reserved applies with even greater force to integral components of
coal like CBM, making it even more likely that the 1955 Congress would have
considered CBM reserved with the coal in the 1909 and 1910 Acts.8
In summary, the 10th Circuit Court found that CBM was intended to be-
long to the coal owner. Congress knew of CBM in 1909 and 1910, and did not
170. Id.
171. See id at 826-27.
172. 462 U.S. 36 (1983).
173. See id. at 36.
174. See Union Oil Co. of Cal., 549 F.2A at 1279.
175. 30 U.S.C. §§ 121-125 (1914).
176. See Aulston v. United States, 915 F.2d 584, 585 (10th Cir. 1990).
177. See Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1967).
178. Southern Ute II, 119 F.3d at 827.
179. See id.
180. 30 U.S.C. §§ 541-541i, 541c (1955).
181. See H.R. REP. No. 84-1478 (1955), reprinted in 1955 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2992, 2996.
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specify non-inclusion, perhaps understanding that at the time it was not sever-
able without destroying the underlying coal.'84 Congress was interested in re-
serving coal as a valuable resource for the benefit of the United States.'" It
follows logically that if Congress had known of CBM's value and severability,
it would have intended its inclusion in the reservation, considering it did reserve
coal that at the time was not commercially valuable."es Additionally, the prin-
ciple of statutory construction that ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the
government works to include CBM in reservations of coal made in 1909 and in
1910.187
VI. ANALYSIS
The divergent results of Southern Ute I and II are based significantly on
the court's self-imposed limitation of making a determination based solely on
interpretation of the 1909 and 1910 Acts. This necessarily encouraged the hy-
per-technical examination of the word "coal" instead of expanding the analysis
to consider whether CBM, as a general proposition, rightfully belongs to the
coal or gas interest holder." While this note commends the result of placing
ownership of CBM with the coal interest holder, it also criticizes the 10th Cir-
cuit for failing to include the physical properties of CBM as a basis for its
determination, thereby forfeiting its opportunity to offer guidance to others
struggling with the question of CBM ownership.
The court in Southern Ute H made the better decision for legal, equitable,
and scientific reasons. The Southern Ute II decision was legally sound for the
simple reason that use of the word "coal" in the Acts of 1909 and 1910 was
latently ambiguous: "[a]mbiguity exists if reasonable persons can find different
meanings in a statute.' ' '89 District Judge Babcock, author of Southern Ute
Iand 10th Circuit Chief Judge Seymour, author of Southern Ute II, qualify as
reasonable people, and clearly they found different meanings for the word
"coal" in the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910. The ambiguity was latent
because although on its face, "coal" appeared clear and intelligible and suggest-
ed a single meaning, extraneous evidence created a necessity for interpretation
or a choice among whether the term included CBM or not.' 9°
As Southern Ute II stressed, when ambiguity existed in the context of land
grants, such ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the sovereign. 9' This
fundamental rule of statutory construction finds support in precedent." When
184. See id. at 823.
185. See Southern Ute 11, 119 F.3d at 825. President Theodore Roosevelt explained the purpose of the
withdrawal of valuable coal lands in his Sixth Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1906). See id.
186. See id. at 826.
187. See id.
188. See Southern Ute I, 874 F. Supp. at 1146; Southern Ute II, 119 F.3d at 819-20. Both courts spent
significant energy on determining what Congress meant by the term "coal." See id.
189. Black's Law Dictionary 52 (Abridged 6th ed. 1991).
190. Id.
191. See Southern Ute 11, 119 F.3d at 821.
192. See Burke v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 234 U.S. 669, 680 (1914); Watt v. Western Nuclear, 462 U.S.
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applied to the case at hand, the rule placed ownership of CBM in the hands of
the coal interest holder, the Southern Ute Indian Tribe.
Equity was satisfied by the Southern Ute II decision. In 1938, under au-
thority of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the United States returned to
various tribes, including the Southern Utes, rights to coal which had previously
been reserved. 93 This was done in an attempt to rectify past unfair treatment
of the Indians. 4 If it had been determined that the right to CBM belonged to
the gas interest holder, the return of coal interests to the Southern Ute Tribe
would have been rendered meaningless. The depth of the majority of coal in
question made it unmineable by current technology.'95 Thus, the coal's prima-
ry value to the Southern Ute Tribe, or for that matter its predecessor in interest,
the United States, came from extraction of CBM. It seems clear that the United
States sought to reserve, and then grant to the Tribe, coal for its value as an
energy source not just an unaccessible, thereby valueless black rock.
There are three other equitable concerns which weigh against granting the
gas interest holder rights to CBM. First, during the period in which CBM was
considered nothing more than a nuisance, the coal interest holder was burdened
with managing the gas during mining operations."9 This is still true today. 197
It makes little sense that CBM should belong to the gas interest holder, who has
never carried a burden related to it, simply because it now has a value. Second,
"release of either absorbed or fracture-trapped CBM requires production tech-
niques which often cause significant damage to the coal."'98 Third, production
of CBM necessarily reduces the amount of CBM within the coal, thereby reduc-
ing the value of the coal rock in the event that future technology allows for its
extraction." For these equitable reasons CBM rights belong with the coal.
The result of the Southern Ute II holding makes scientific sense due to the
nature of coal as both the source rock and the reservoir for CBM.' Although
some methane does migrate to cracks or fractures within the coal seam, the
highly porous structure of coal traps most of the methane that is produced dur-
ing coalificationRI Thus, in place, the CBM physically trapped in coal is nec-
36, 59 (1983); United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 116(1957).
193. See Southern Ute 1, 874 F. Supp. at 1151.
194. See id.
195. See Choate, supra note 29, at 196. The area in dispute is located in the northern portion of the
Fruitland formation of the San Juan Basin. Of the 200 billion tons of coal within the Fruitland formation,
approximately 14 billion tons are strippable, 14 billion are at a depth between 500 and 1,000 feet, and 28
billion are between 1,000 and 2,000 feet. The remainder is located between 2,000 and in excess of 4,000 feet,
with the deepest beds occurring in the North. See id.
196. See Maurice Deul and Ann G. Kim, Research in Methane Control, in METHANE CONTROL RE-
SEARCH: SUMMARY OF RESULTS, 1964-80 at 3 (Maurice Deul and Ann G. Kim, eds., Bureau of Mines Bulle-
tin/1988).
197. 30 U.S.C. §§801-960 (1976).
198. See Southern Ute 11, 119 F.3d at 822.
199. See C.T. Rightmire, Coalbed Methane Resource, in AAPG STUDIES IN GEOLOGY SERIES #17:
COALBED METHANE RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES I, 11 (Craig T. Rightmire, et al. eds., 1984). For
high-volatile A-bituminous coal, the maximum producible gas is estimated to be 68%, leaving a residual of
only approximately 32%. See id.
200. See Levine, supra note 26, at 40.
201. See Lewin et al., Unlocking the Fire supra note 21, at 573.
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essarily retained with the coal reservoir and should belong to the coal own-
er." From an historic perspective, this is especially true "[b]ecause no effec-
tive means existed in 1909 to remove CBM leaving the coal behind." 3
The 10th Circuit's decision was based solely on interpretation and con-
struction of the 1909 and 1910 Acts.2°4 Because of the narrowness of the 10th
Circuit holding, it offers little aid to those in conflict over CBM where the
severance of the coal interest was not undertaken by the United States govern-
ment. Thus, the decision falls short in addressing disputes over CBM where the
coal and gas interests have been severed from one another under any other
circumstances. The 10th Circuit decision does not have direct application to any
lands not included in the 65 million acres in the western United States specified
by the 1906 withdrawal of lands to which patents were issued under the Coal
Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910.' By definition, the entire eastern United
States was left out. This is unfortunate because nationally there is a real need
for legal conclusiveness regarding the ownership of CBM. Specifically, the
court could have based its holding on both legal and scientific theories.
A holding that CBM always belongs to the coal interest holder absent
specific language transferring that right away may conflict with some case law,
which has been mixed regarding migrated CBM.2' 7 The varied results in prior
case law is due to the more tenuous relationship between the coal and migrated
CBM. The 10th Circuit declined to even address migrated coal in Southern Ute
I. 2°8 However, it makes sense to place ownership of both in-place and migrat-
ed CBM with the coal interest holder. When CBM migrates, it does so through
fractures, either man-made, 9 or naturally occurring.21 Once a fracture ex-
ists, the CBM will migrate to secondary reservoirs; "the coalbed continues to
recharge the [secondary] reservoir as that reservoir is depleted by the well.""
Thus, production of CBM located in adjacent non-coal strata drains CBM from
the source coal.
A determination that all CBM belongs to the coal interest holder is ulti-
mately easier to manage than splitting ownership based upon which strata the
CBM is extracted from. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine
where the gas produced is from, while a scientific analysis can identify whether
202. See Southern Ute 11, 119 F.3d at 823.
203. Id.
204. See id.
205. See Southern Ute 1, 874 F. Supp. at 1149. This was the acreage originally withdrawn that the Coal
Lands Acts were meant to address. See id.
206. An often cited inhibitor to production of CBM is the lack of legal guidance. See, e.g., Rightmire,
.supra note 199, at 11; Olson, supra note 10, at 378; Lewin et al., Unlocking the Fire supra note 21, at 568.
207. See, e.g., Carbon County v. Baird, No.DV 90-120, slip op. At 11, 1992 WL 464786 at *5(coal own-
er has title to CBM); United States Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983) (coal owner has title to
CBM "in-place," suggesting that migrated CBM belongs to the gas interest holder); Pinnacle Petroleum Co. v.
Jim Walter Resources, Inc., No. CV-87-3012 (Cir.Ct. Mobile County, Ala. 1989) (coal owners have title to
CBM, including that migrated).
208. See Southern Ute II, at 822 fn 7.
209. See Deul & Kim, Coal Beds: A Source of Natural Gas, supra note 24, at 49.
210. See Rightmire, supra note 199, at 10.
211. Id. at 11.
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the gas is CBM or another type of natural gas."'
VII. CONCLUSION
The 10th Circuit holding in Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Produc-
tion Company, placing rights to CBM in the Tribe, was well supported by law
and science. The congressional enactment that led to the Tribe's ownership of
coal was latently ambiguous, and therefore, application of the cannon of con-
struction that ambiguity in government reservations should be resolved in favor
of the sovereign was appropriate. The result of this construction was that the
government reservation of coal included CBM, both of which were subsequent-
ly transferred to the Southern Ute Tribe subject to their exclusive control.
Although the court did not rely on the scientific relationship between coal
and CBM in reaching its decision, science supports the holding. CBM is pro-
duced while coal develops, and is retained within the coalbed until a fracture
allows for release. Thus, the owner of the coalbed necessarily owns the CBM
trapped within it. Classifying all CBM as property of the coal owner is scientif-
ically legitimate. The court could have broadened the basis for its decision to
include the nature of CBM, thereby aiding the production of this valuable re-
source by offering legal guidance to producers.
Amy Callard
212. See id. at 6.
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